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Is Respect for Autonomy Defensible?
ABSTRACT
This paper makes three main claims. First, I argue that Onora O'Neill has uncovered a serious
problem in the way medical ethicists have thought about both respect for autonomy and
informed consent. Medical ethicists have tended to think that autonomous choices are
intrinsically worthy of respect, and that informed consent procedures are the best way to
respect the autonomous choices of individuals. However, O'Neill convincingly argues that we
should abandon both these thoughts.
Second, I argue that O’Neill’s proposed solution to this problem is inadequate.
O’Neill’s approach requires us to adopt a more modest view of the purpose of informed
consent procedures. On her view, the purpose of informed consent procedures is simply to
avoid deception and coercion, and the ethical justification for informed consent derives from a
different ethical principle, which she calls principled autonomy. I argue that contrary to what
O'Neill claims, we cannot derive the wrongness of coercion from principled autonomy, and so
its credentials as a justification for informed consent procedures is weak.
Third, I argue that we do better to rethink autonomy and informed consent in terms of
respecting persons as ends in themselves, and a characteristically liberal commitment to
allowing individuals to make certain categories of decisions for themselves.
INTRODUCTION
Respect for autonomy is in trouble. In recent work in this Journal
1 and elsewhere
2 Onora
O'Neill has forcefully argued that respect for autonomy, as it has come to be used in medical
ethics, is philosophically indefensible. If her arguments are sound then, contrary to the
standard view, respect for autonomy cannot be the source of the ethical requirement to seek3
informed consent before treating a patient or enrolling a participant in a trial. So her critique
goes to the heart of contemporary medical ethics: if O'Neill is right, medical ethicists have
systematically misunderstood two of the most fundamental concepts they deal with – respect
for autonomy and informed consent.
This paper has four sections. Section 1 distinguishes between three different ways of
talking about respect for autonomy, and looks in more detail at the one that has come to be
central to bioethical writing on informed consent, namely the idea that we should respect
autonomous choices. Section 2 argues, following O’Neill, that it is implausible to think that
the purpose of informed consent requirements is to respect autonomous choices. Section 3
argues that O’Neill’s proposed reworking of autonomy and informed consent is inadequate.
O’Neill’s approach requires us to adopt a more modest view of the purpose of informed
consent procedures. On her view, the purpose of informed consent procedures is simply to
avoid deception and coercion, and the ethical justification for informed consent derives from a
different ethical principle, which she calls principled autonomy. I argue that contrary to what
O'Neill claims, we cannot derive the wrongness of coercion from principled autonomy, and so
its credentials as a justification for informed consent procedures is weak. Section 4 argues that
we do better to rethink autonomy and informed consent in terms of respecting persons as ends
in themselves, and a characteristically liberal commitment to allowing individuals to make
certain categories of decisions for themselves.
THREE CONCEPTIONS OF AUTONOMY
There are at least three different things that “autonomy” is used to refer to when medical
ethicists claim that we should respect a patient or a research participant’s autonomy:
1. Autonomy sometimes refers to the capacity to make autonomous choices, with the
underlying claim being that beings who are capable of making autonomous choices4
are worthy of a respect that beings who lack this capacity are not.
2. Autonomy sometimes refers to autonomous choices, with the underlying claim being
that autonomous choices are worthy of a respect that nonautonomous choices are not.
3. Autonomy sometimes refers to a sphere of decisional privacy, with the underlying
claim being that we should respect autonomy by allowing persons to make certain
sorts of choices for themselves without coercing or otherwise interfering with them.
While all three senses of respect for autonomy are to be found in the literature (and sometimes
side-by-side in the same article), it is the second which has come to predominate, following
influential expositions by Faden and Beauchamp
3 and by Beauchamp and Childress.
4
O’Neill’s argument is directed against this second conception, which she refers to as
“individual autonomy”, and as we shall see shortly, makes a powerful case against taking it to
be a fundamental value in medical ethics.
In general, respect is an attitude one adopts towards someone or something, which is
characterised by the judgement that the respected thing or person places legitimate limits on
what one may do with it, or to it. Something that is worthy of respect can be either
intrinsically or extrinsically worthy of respect. When something is extrinsically worthy of
respect, it is worthy of respect because of something else. For example, the pen that Lincoln
used to sign the Emancipation Proclamation could plausibly count as extrinsically worthy of
respect.
5 (We might think it wrong to destroy it, for instance, but the reason it would be wrong
to do so is the role the pen played in history, not anything related to the particular structure or
craftsmanship of the pen itself). Something that is intrinsically worthy of respect, on the other
hand, is worthy of respect just in virtue of what it is. Many people think that human beings are
worthy of respect just in virtue of being human.
The different accounts of respect for autonomy suggest different kinds of respect5
claims. Sense 1 suggests that autonomy is a feature of persons that grounds a duty to treat
them with respect: we should respect persons (at least in part) in virtue of their capacity for
autonomy. On this view, autonomy is intrinsically worthy of respect: a being that is
autonomous is worthy of respect just in virtue of being autonomous. This line of thinking has
its roots in Kant’s conception of persons as ends in themselves: “rational beings are called
persons inasmuch as their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves, i.e. as
something which is not to be used merely as means and hence there is imposed a limit on the
arbitrary use of such beings, which are thus objects of respect.”.
6
Sense 3 implies that autonomy as decisional privacy is only extrinsically worthy of
respect: we should respect people's decisional privacy not for its own sake, but because doing
so will have beneficial consequences. This line of thinking has its roots in Mill.
7
It is less clear what kind of respect claim underlies sense 2. Clearly, sense 2 implies
that autonomy is a feature of certain choices and not others, and suggests that the reason to
respect those choices is that they are autonomous. But what is the nature of the respect that
autonomous choices are due: should we treat autonomous choices as worthy of respect in the
way that Lincoln’s fountain pen is, or in the way that a person is?
The argument I am about to give points up two serious difficulties for those who think
that autonomous choices are intrinsically worthy of respect. First, even if it is true to claim
that autonomous choices are intrinsically worthy of respect, this claim can have little
relevance to bioethics, since only very few choices will count as autonomous in the relevant
way; and second; given that informed consent procedures protect both autonomous and
nonautonomous choices indiscriminately, the claim that it is respect for autonomous choices
which leads us to seek informed consent is highly dubious. The final section defends an
account of respect for individuals’ healthcare choices which makes such choices extrinsically
worthy of respect.6
PROBLEMS WITH INTRINSIC RESPECT FOR AUTONOMOUS
CHOICES AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR INFORMED CONSENT
The claim that any and all choices that individuals make are intrinsically worthy of respect is
manifestly implausible, given that some choices are “self-centred, pig-headed, impulsive,
random, ignorant, out of control and regrettable or unacceptable for these and many other
reasons”
8 So it is clear that we cannot let just any old choice count as autonomous if we are
going to claim that all autonomous choices are intrinsically worthy of respect.
Any account which wants to claim that autonomous choices are intrinsically worthy of
respect must meet two constraints. First, its criterion for what makes a choice autonomous
must correctly latch onto a feature that does make a choice worthy of respect just in virtue of
possessing it: if it did not do so, then it would remain unexplained why we should treat
autonomous, but not nonautonomous choices as worthy of respect. It is plausible to think that
any such criterion would have to be fairly demanding; and would certainly have to go beyond
the factors of being adequately informed and acting voluntarily, given that there are morally
repugnant acts and choices which share these features, and which we would presumably not
want to count as worthy of respect in themselves.
Second, it must place autonomous choices within the ability every normal adult. This
requirement is not rendered necessary by the concept of autonomous choice: it is perfectly
coherent to have a concept of autonomy (like Nietzsche's conception
9) under which few
persons, and few actions, turn out to be autonomous. But such a position would clearly be
incompatible with the antipaternalistic assumptions of modern bioethics.
However no account of autonomous choices could meet both constraints
simultaneously: if an account makes autonomy sufficiently demanding that actions which
meet it are worthy of respect for their own sake, then the account will be too demanding to
allow the vast majority of the choices that patients make about their healthcare in a hospital7
setting to count as autonomous. However, if the account is sufficiently lax as to allow the
ordinary choices of patients in a hospital setting to meet it, then we will no longer have reason
to think of such choices as worthy of respect in their own right.
In practice, defenders of the intrinsic respect worthiness of autonomous choice attempt
to mask this problem by shifting their claims according to the context. When they talk in
terms of why autonomous choices should be respected, they give a fairly demanding account
which refers to authenticity, second order desires, or self-mastery and so on. But when they
come to apply their principle of respect for autonomy in practice, they tend to be much more
permissive, and assume respect for autonomy is appropriately operationalised through the
seeking of informed consent. However, as O’Neill argues it is highly implausible to think that
informed consent requirements could provide the appropriate response to the intrinsic respect-
worthiness of autonomous choices: “[b]y insisting on the importance of informed consent we
make it possible for individuals to choose autonomously, however that is to be construed. But
we in no way guarantee or require that they do so.”
10 Informed consent does nothing to ensure
that autonomous choices are respected in a way that nonautonomous choices are not: as
O'Neill puts it, “Requirements for informed consent are relevant to specifically autonomous
choice only because they are relevant to choice of all sorts”.
11 Hence it seems at best
somewhat misleading to claim that in seeking informed consent we are acting out of the
intrinsic respect-worthiness of autonomous choices.
O’Neill's argument points up two fundamental problems: first, even if it is true to
claim that autonomous choices are intrinsically worthy of respect, this claim has little
relevance to bioethics, since only very few choices will count as autonomous in the
appropriate way; and second, given that informed consent procedures protect both
autonomous and nonautonomous choices indiscriminately, at the very least it requires further
explanation why seeking informed consent is the best way to respect autonomous choices. For8
if our true goal were to respect autonomous choices, it would seem to be better to adopt a
policy which allowed us to discriminate between those choices that are autonomous and those
that are not. So O’Neill’s argument leaves us with a problem both for bioethicists’ standard
views of respect for autonomy, and bioethicists’ standard views of the justification of
informed consent procedures.
PRINCIPLED AUTONOMY
O'Neill's proposed solution is twofold. First, to urge a less grandiose conception of the
purpose of informed consent procedures: on her view the purpose of informed consent is to
ensure that no one is coerced or deceived, and it is not to ensure that autonomous choices are
respected. Second, to introduce another conception of autonomy, which she calls calls
“principled autonomy”, and to argue that this conception of autonomy should be foundational
for bioethics.
O’Neill’s conception of principled autonomy whilst new to bioethics, has a long
pedigree elsewhere: for it is the conception of autonomy which Kant articulated in his
universal law formulation of the categorical imperative. As O’Neill expresses it, principled
autonomy is “a matter of acting on certain sorts of principles, and especially on principles of
obligation... principled autonomy is expressed in action whose principle could be adopted by
all others.”
12 O’Neill argues that this conception of autonomy allows us to see that the wrongs
that informed consent aims to protect against – coercion and deception – are wrongs
independently of an appeal to respect for autonomous choices. I shall suggest that O'Neill’s
conception of principled autonomy fails to evade the classic difficulties that affect the
universal law formulation of the categorical imperative, and that pace O’Neill principled
autonomy in fact fails to rule out coercion, and so its credentials as a justification for the
requirement to seek informed consent are weak.9
O'Neill argues that we can derive a requirement not to coerce, and a requirement not to
deceive from the idea of principled autonomy: “an agent who adopts a principle of coercion
must also will some effective means of coercion (violence, intimidation, whatever else might
work). So an agent who (hypothetically) wills a principle of coercion as a universal law must
also (hypothetically) will that everybody use some effective means of coercion. However
since there will be at least some coercive action in any world where all are committed to a
principle of coercion, at least some persons would then be unable to adopt a principle of
coercion because their capacities for action would be destroyed or undermined by others’
coercive action... Coercion is necessarily a minority pastime, and universal coercion cannot be
willed without internal contradiction.”
13
There is an ambiguity in this argument. Is the thing that makes coercion morally bad
supposed to be the fact that coercion destroys other persons’ capacities for action, or the fact
that coercion cannot be universalised? If the thing that is morally bad about coercion is that it
destroys other persons’ capacities for action, then it looks like principled autonomy is not
playing any real role here, and the real work is being done by the claim that it is wrong to
undermine others’ capacities for action. (In this case we might ask if the value in the
background is in fact an idea of respect for persons).
But, if the moral problem with coercion is supposed to be the fact that it cannot be
universalised, then the argument faces the following two problems. First it seems wrong to
claim that the mere fact that something cannot be willed universally without contradiction
shows that doing that thing is wrong. For example, you cannot universally will the maxim of
leaving work an hour early to beat the traffic without contradiction: for if everyone acted on
this maxim, the rush hour would merely start an hour early, and you would still be stuck in the
traffic. However, leaving work an hour early to beat the traffic is not immoral. So even if
universal coercion could not be willed without contradiction, this would not be sufficient to10
explain why it is immoral.
Second, it is untrue to claim either that coercion is necessarily a minority pastime or
that universal coercion cannot be willed without contradiction. O’Neill’s argument seems to
presuppose that the relationship of coercion is transitive: that if A can coerce B, and B can
coerce C, then A will be able to coerce C and hence C will be unable to adopt a maxim of
coercion, as he will be unable to coerce either A nor B. But the relationship of coercion is not
transitive, and so there is no contradiction in a society in which everyone is able to coerce
someone else. Suppose, for example A is the CEO of a company; B the line manager, and C
the underling. While the CEO might be able to coerce the line manager, and the line manager
coerce the underling, the underling may still be able to coerce the CEO, because, say of some
secret he knows about the CEO.
So even assuming that O’Neill is right, and that it is appropriate to have a less
grandiose conception of informed consent which does not appeal to respect for autonomous
choices, it is wrong to think that principled autonomy can justify the requirement for
informed consent.
HOW WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY AND
INFORMED CONSENT
O’Neill’s argument shows at the very least that there is a grave need for greater clarity in what
we mean by respect for autonomy, and why we think it is important. Without this our thinking
will be confused and contradictory. So how should we proceed? Assuming that each of the
conceptions of respect for autonomy that we started from (respect for persons in virtue of their
capacity for autonomy, respect for autonomous choices, and respect for decisional privacy)
have some legitimate role to play in our ethical thinking, the challenge is to find a way of
taking each into account in the appropriate way. I shall sketch one such account, rooted in the
work of the political philosopher John Rawls, which allows us to reconcile the new insights11
that O’Neill has brought to the debate about respect for autonomy and informed consent with
some of bioethicists’ more traditional concerns.
I suggest that we take respect for persons in virtue of their capacity for autonomy to be
the most fundamental sense of respect for autonomy, and to rethink our conceptions of
respecting autonomous choices and of informed consent in terms of this value. Rawls argues
that human beings are worthy of respect in virtue of what he calls the two moral powers,
namely the capacity for a conception of the good, and the capacity for a sense of justice. All
beings who have the two moral powers are moral equals, and must be treated with equal
respect.
14
We should make sense of respect for autonomous choices and of informed consent
within this broader framework. Those who have the two moral powers are in Rawls' words
“self-authenticating sources of valid claims.”
15 That is, just in virtue of having the two moral
powers, a person has a right to make claims on others and to have their views taken seriously:
so a requirement to respect the choices of persons follows from the more basic respect. But
this requirement is circumscribed by the more fundamental requirement to respect each
person as an equal in virtue of their two moral powers. Hence there is no requirement to
respect choices or evaluative perspectives that are incompatible with equal respect for all, and
indeed, absent special circumstances, there is a requirement to actively combat such choices
and values.
It is important to notice that respecting autonomous choices entails different duties in
different normative contexts: in Elizabeth Anderson's words, “to respect a customer is to
respect her privacy by not probing more deeply into her reasons for wanting a commodity
than is required to satisfy her want. The seller does not question her tastes. But to respect a
fellow citizen is to take her reasons for advocating a position seriously. It is to consult her
judgment about political matters, to respond to it in a public forum, and to accept it if one12
finds her judgment superior to others”.
16 It follows that before we can think about the duties
that follow from a requirement to respect autonomous choices, we need to work out what
norms would appropriately structure choices of this type.
Informed consent procedures will be an appropriate way of respecting autonomous
choices only in certain circumstances. Informed consent procedures give the person from
whom consent is sought from a right of veto over something being done to them, which they
are allowed to exercise for arbitrary reasons. One important justification for thinking that
many kinds of choices should be left up to the choice of the individual in this way is the sheer
intractable variety of views of the most worthwhile life for a human being. As Rawls argues,
there are strong reasons to think that, even amongst conscientious and reasonable persons
given unlimited time to discuss, we would still not find a consensus on how a human being
should live.
17 Moreover, any attempt to enforce a state sanctioned conception of the good life
will surely have unacceptable results, as was evidenced in the Reformation and its
aftermath.
18 The liberal solution to these difficulties has always been to treat a large swathe of
choices about how the individual wishes to live their life as private, thus allowing each person
freedom to pursue their own conception of the good without forcing them to justify
themselves to others, where such choices do not impinge unfairly on the interests of others.
Most medical decisions that patients make fall squarely within this territory staked out
by the liberal principle of allowing each person to pursue their own conception of the good,
but not all do. In particular, public health cases can raise a problem, where parents refuse
newborn screening on behalf of their children (thus imposing an increased risk of harm on
their child)
19 or where someone refuses treatment for a serious infectious disease (thus putting
other persons in danger); and in such cases there is a case (though often a defeasible one) for
not allowing the person the right to refuse which informed consent implies.
Informed consent procedures, on this account, are justified by this liberal idea of13
treating decisions about conceptions of the good as private. Their justification is not that the
decisions that people make as a result of informed consent procedures will be autonomous in
such a way as to render these decisions intrinsically worthy of respect, but rather that it would
be wrong and counterproductive nature to attempt to enforce a particular conception of the
good, and the best way to avoid doing so is to allow each person the privacy to make
decisions in line with their own values. If this rough sketch is correct we have the beginnings
of a theory that will allow us to defend the role of respect for autonomy and informed consent
in medical ethics, whilst also allowing us to draw any such limits to the use of informed
consent procedures that we think on balance to be morally required by our commitments to
public health measures.
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